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Introduction 
 
Internal conflict has become the predominant threat to the security and stability of many of 
the small island nations of the Southwest Pacific and particularly in the countries of 
Melanesia. 
 
Since the late 1980s, conflicts of varying causes and degrees of intensity have occurred in 
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville secession attempt)i, Fiji (coups and attempted coups), 
Vanuatu (police rebellion) and Solomon Islands (ethnic conflict and coup). 
 
These events have seriously debilitated the already fragile national economies and polities 
of all countries, so much so in the Solomon Islands that that country is now being described 
by many analysts as a “failing”, if not “failed”, state.ii  
 
While most of these countries have so far been able (not without difficulty) to maintain a 
measure of state integrity, the situation in Solomon Islands has become so precarious that 
Australia and New Zealand (with the support of most Pacific Island governments and 
anticipating a request from the Solomons’ parliament) are preparing to intervene in an 
attempt to restore the rule of law and rebuild administrative institutions.  The form of that 
intervention is not yet clear - it is thought likely to include up to 2,000 armed military and 
police with a large team of civilian technical personnel – nor has a mandate been 
determined. 
 
In this context a host of questions arises as to how best to resolve, contain, manage and/or 
transform these internal conflicts in the interest of the security, stability and well-being of 
the peoples of the countries concerned and of the region as a whole. 
 
What are the “ways out” - or “ways through” - such conflicts?  What are the appropriate 
domestic strategies, policies and mechanisms for resolving conflict and producing stability?  
Are they sufficient to the task?  What roles can (and should) regional states play in helping 
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states manage, settle or ameliorate internal conflict?  Is external intervention the answer?  
What is the likely impact of such intervention?  Is there a regional security architecture that 
might be useful in these circumstances?  Is there a role for NGOs?  Is conflict prevention 
possible?  And if so, how?  Do the answers not lie in a holistic approach to improving the 
processes of economic development and governance?  And if so what agencies and policies 
are most likely to bring this about?  How has the region responded to date?  These 
questions deserve serious consideration and doubtless many will have been explored in 
presentations and discussions at this conference.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider one form of conflict management undertaken 
recently in the region; that is, the peace monitoring interventions by Australia, New 
Zealand and some Pacific Island Countries (PICs) in Bougainville and Solomon Islands.  
How useful have these exercises been in assisting peace processes and in conflict 
management/peace construction, and what lessons can be drawn from them for any future 
such operations - including perhaps for the more vigorous “co-operative intervention” 
currently in prospect? 
 
From 1997 to 2003, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and later the Peace Monitoring 
Group (PMG), consisting of unarmed Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Islands’ 
military and civilian personnel, provided support to and helped facilitate the peace process 
in Bougainville.  These external groups, numbering from 250 to 300 personnel at various 
points in time, were agreed to by the parties to the Burnham and Lincoln peace conferences 
held in 1997   and 1998.  In Solomon Islands, following the conclusion of the Townsville 
Peace Agreement (TPA) in October 2000 to mid-2002, an International Peace Monitoring 
Team (IPMT) comprising 50 unarmed police and civilian personnel from Australia, New 
Zealand and other PICs, was established to work in support of the indigenous Peace 
Monitoring Council (PMC) that had also been set up by the parties to the TPA to advance 
the cause of peace. 
 
While the specific mandates and responsibilities of the PMG and IPMT differed – and the 
resources available to the two operations also differed substantially – the expectation of the 
signatories to the peace agreements was that by providing a neutral, physical presence, by 
undertaking community confidence-building activities, and by facilitating contact between 
stakeholders in the respective peace processes, these interventions would help consolidate 
peace and reduce the prospect of renewed fighting. 
 
Note that these were not “coercive interventions” or “humanitarian interventions” in which 
armed forces under, for example, United Nations’ or regional agency command are inserted 
into a civil conflict to stop fighting and bloodshed and to make or keep the peace.  They 
were unarmed and neutral “monitoring” operations consisting of military, police and 
civilian personnel inserted after peace agreements had been reached between combatants 
and authorities.  These were a type of intervention designed to assist in conflict 
management and amelioration – as part of the larger peace process – rather than as the 
prime mover of the process.iii (At times, however, the PMG saw it as its responsibility to 
help maintain, or re-start, the momentum of the process when it flagged).  
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Note also that in attempting to learn and apply “lessons” from one country’s conflict to 
another’s, methodological difficulties arise.  Conflicts – and resolutions – are often context 
specific and the factors in play in one conflict/post-conflict situation do not always translate 
well to others.  But while there are obvious limits to comparisons, it is nonetheless possible 
to generate at least some “rules of thumb”, particularly since there has been (a) such a large 
number of monitoring interventions of various kinds and (b) that the learning of lessons 
especially from UN operations has become something of an industry. iv    
 
Conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands 
 
The origins of the Bougainville conflict date back to before the 1970s, but intensified in that 
decade when the BCL copper and gold mine backed by the colonial Australian 
administration commenced operations at Panguna in central Bougainville and during the 
mid-1970s during PNG’s transition to independence when Bougainvilleans only reluctantly 
agreed to be a part of the new state.  In late 1988, aggrieved landowners around the 
Panguna minesite took violent action against the mine and resisted efforts by the PNG 
police – and from May 1989 by the PNG Defence Force - to have them desist.  Support 
grew for the landowners and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), fighting 
escalated and the conflict took on an “ethnic and separatist character”. v The security forces 
pulled out, a situation of anarchy developed after March 1990, and a kind of “ethnic 
cleansing” occurred whereby thousands on non-Bougainvilleans were chased out of the 
province.  But the antagonism was not just against outsiders as Bougainvilleans fought each 
other often over disputes that had occurred long before the mine and the secession 
movement.  A Bougainville Resistance Force formed in the north of the island opposed to 
the BRA thus allowing the security forces back into the island.   
 
Regan describes the consequences of the fighting between then and 1997 as having had a 
“terrible impact” with widespread deaths (in his view several thousands of civilians and 
several hundreds of police and fighters), displaced people numbering 60,000 or more (i.e. a 
third of the population), severely damaged infrastructure, loss of all revenue from the mine, 
economic collapse and the destruction of what had been the most effective government of 
any kind in the Pacific Islands region.vi   
 
In 1997 groups came together to attempt a peace settlement and in the Burnham (NZ) Truce 
of October 1997 committed themselves to peace and reconciliation and agreed to the 
emplacement of a regional truce monitoring team (TMG) led by New Zealand.  Following 
the Lincoln (NZ) agreement in early 1998 the Peace Monitoring Group replaced the TMG 
led by an Australian army officer.  Five team sites were established, regular patrolling 
throughout the province occurred, and the numbers of monitors reduced from 300 to 200 
after year 2000.  The mandate for the PMG included reporting on the compliance of parties 
with all aspects of the ceasefire agreement, instilling community confidence, providing 
information to the people about the peace process, and – in what became its most important 
role - facilitating the implementation of the Lincoln agreement.   The PMG has only 
recently been wound up – end June 2003 – and replaced by a Transition Team of 17 
unarmed civilians. 
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The peace process has thus moved over five years from a truce arrangement to a full peace 
agreement with PNG with autonomy arrangements guaranteed and the prospect of a 
referendum on independence in the future.  Work has commenced on rebuilding the 
administration of Bougainville and although internal tensions remain and the potential for 
the process to come off the rails exists (partly because the instigator of it all, Francis Ona, 
refuses to join the process, and partly because revenue flows to re-build government 
services and infrastructure are uncertain), there is an air of confidence that the peace 
process has succeeded.  The work of the PMG has been instrumental in much of this by 
providing what Regan describes as invaluable “political space” for the parties to sort 
themselves out.  The monitoring process as a consequence can duly claim to have been 
successful.  
 
The ethnic tension and conflict that erupted in late 1998 in the Solomon Islands was the 
product of an armed uprising by a group of young Guadalcanal men bent on intimidating 
and chasing non-Guadalacanal peoples off the hinterland and back into Honiara.  The 
Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army which later became the Isatabu Freedom fighters then the 
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) drew some inspiration from the BRA and other 
Bougainvillean refugees who had made their way to Solomons in the 1990s, but their cause 
largely focused on the belief that settlers – mostly from the province of Malaita – had 
illegally acquired land, were denying them job opportunities and had been disrespectful of 
their culture.vii  A number of attempts were made throughout 1999 to mediate the conflict 
but to no avail.  
 
The Malaitans fought back and in early 2000 formed the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF) 
which in June 2000 combined with a powerful section of the Police Force (in composition 
mostly Malaitan) to stage a coup against the SI government (SIG) led by Bartholomew 
Ulufa’alu (himself a Malaitan).  Violence, killings and open confrontations continued as the 
MEF, augmented by police resources raided villages and coastal areas immediately outside 
Honiara.  Representations by the Australian and New Zealand governments assisted in 
negotiating a ceasefire in August and when that failed further negotiations brought a 
response from the parties to participate in a peace conference in Townsville in October 
2000.   
 
The Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) resulted and although the militant groups 
celebrated the end of fighting, their commitment to the peace process was never strong or 
genuine.  The TPA was a flawed agreement (see below), but it did establish a framework 
for taking the peace process forward by establishing a Peace Monitoring Council (PMC) 
consisting of eminent, professional Solomon Islanders chaired by former Prime Minister, 
Sir Peter Kenilorea, a Malaitan, with Paul Tovua, a Guadalcanal man and at that time the 
Speaker of Parliament, as his deputy.  The mandate of the PMC was to oversee the peace 
process, pursue the recommendations made in the TPA (from weapons, amnesties, stolen 
property, land claims, demilitarisation, rehabilitation, police restructuring, to infrastructure 
projects and reconciliation), and to enforce compliance.  But it had no enforcement 
authority and was dependent on the SIG. 
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The TPA parties also agreed to the establishment of an International Peace Monitoring 
Team (IPMT) consisting of unarmed monitors from Australia, New Zealand (and later from 
Vanuatu, Tonga and the Cook Islands) that would work in support of the PMC with 
particular responsibility for collecting weapons from the militants and communities as well 
as conducting confidence-building activities in Guadalcanal and Malaita.  The IPMT 
established six team sites and conducted patrols to all parts of the Guadalcanal and Malaita 
provinces.  It worked in tandem with the PMC monitoring teams engaging with 
communities, visiting schools and churches, facilitating meetings, attempting initiatives 
such as ‘weapons-free villages’, making regular contact with militants, and assisting groups 
keen to reconcile. 
 
The impact of the conflict was severe.  More than 20,000 people were displaced; the 
number of conflict related deaths was well over 200; the police were compromised and 
hopelessly divided; the economy was bankrupted; the parliamentary and political system 
was abused and corrupted (not least through the resignation of the Prime Minister under 
duress; the public service was gutted; and service delivery to most parts of the country all 
but decimated). 
 
The peace process worked reasonably well for perhaps six months or so.  Many weapons 
were collected from villagers by the IPMT, but militant leaders and their gang members as 
well as the police refused to part with their modern high-powered guns.  Some senior 
political figures who had also benefited from the raiding of the police armoury on June 5th 
were known to have weapons, but refused to turn them in.  But the peace game was very 
quickly surpassed by the political game.  For the politicians and militants alike the peace 
game was largely irrelevant.  The SIG never seriously engaged in the peace process.  
Access to “compensation” and other resources of the state was the main game.viii    Irregular 
politics displaced regular politics; the integrity of the state was very much in question.  
Those who had fomented the coup in June 2000 were still by and large in control. 
 
What then was the verdict on the IPMT?  I think it fair to say that it was a partially 
successful operation.  It was certainly well received in the rural communities, it for a time 
established good rapport with militant leaders, it succeeded in collecting and later disposing 
over 2100 weapons, and it helped mobilise and give confidence to elements of civil society 
that remain active today.  If the PMG had provided Bougainvilleans with some “political 
space”, the IPMT and PMC had provided Solomon Islanders some “breathing space”.   But 
some fifteen months on from the TPA, it was clear that both monitoring organisations had 
become only marginally effective (although the continued existence of the PMC - later to 
become the National Peace Council - as a focal point for peace efforts was critical).  
 
Lessons and Questions 
 
In this section I attempt to draw some of the lessons from the Peace Monitoring operations 
in Bougainville and Solomon Islands as a guide for those engaged in peace practice. They 
are more “rules of thumb” rather than “best practice”; some are unequivocal, others less so; 
most are interconnected.  Many “lessons” are drawn as much from the peace processes 
themselves as from the specific operations of the monitoring teams.  What follows is not a 
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blow-by-blow evaluation but observations drawn from my personal experience in 
Solomons and from the writing and conversations with others, especially from Anthony 
Regan, in Bougainville. 
 
1. Thorough, on-going analysis.  The first lesson is the need for thorough and on-going 
analysis.  Peace practitioners (and policy makers) in my view can never learn enough about 
the cultural bases of Melanesian conflicts - about their origins, complexity, longevity, role 
in group cohesion, and in inter-group relations; about how “new” conflicts can re-ignite 
seemingly totally separate dormant ones; about leadership in fighting as distinct from 
politics; about retribution; and the processes of mediation and reconciliation.ix 
 
In the same way as military generals study the history of warfare, peace practitioners need 
to be aware of the way combatants “do” their fighting. In addition, policy-makers and 
practitioners need an appreciation of what stage the fighting (conflict) has reached and be 
able to assess the viability of continued conflict at the time an intervention is to take place.  
The “hurting stalemate”, for example, that was thought to have been reached on 
Bougainville by the mid-to-late 1990’s and which made the agreement on peace more 
likely, contrasted with the situation in Solomons where clearly a situation of “conflict 
unresolved” applied even after the signing of the TPA in 2000.x  Practitioners also need to 
be aware of the character of conflict and not fall into the easy trap of labeling such fighting 
as “ethnic” as if that was sufficient explanation in itself.  There is of course an ethnic 
character to much of the conflict in Melanesia, but its roots – as in Solomons – are usually 
bound up with uneven development, perceived inequities or injustices and chronically poor 
governance.  I suggest we look at ethnicity less as cause and more as “force multiplier” in 
the understanding of conflict.  Inter-generational leadership struggles within groups also 
occur during periods of turmoil and complicate analysis.  
 
In addition to an understanding of the “anthropology of conflict”, an analysis of 
contemporary political power balances and relationships – who has influence and clout both 
in the formal system and behind the scenes - is essential for external practitioners 
attempting to move the peace process forward.  As well, recognition of the broader socio-
political factors and trends that have precipitated conflicts elsewhere is important. 
Demographic stress, including the “youth bulge”, dysfunctional governance, increasing 
criminalisation, alienated and  “rudderless” groups, susceptibility to “pyramid” get-rich-
quick schemes, and external linkages to criminals or dissident elements are examples of 
such trends. 
 
Rigourous analysis helps shape the nature and composition of the intervention and is 
essential for informing the work of those in the field.xi  Not all of course can be absorbed in 
pre-intervention training – the stories of the TMG, PMG and IPMT monitors are replete 
with examples of the use of “cultural guides” from local communities that added to their 
effectiveness.xii  (Two caveats – additional lessons if you like: care needs to be taken that 
analysis does not lead to paralysis; and “best-case” analysis / optimistic assumptions must 
be guarded against). 
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2. “Being there”.  A positive lesson to be drawn from both monitoring operations is the 
immense value that a neutral “physical presence” of “outsiders” on the ground, amongst the 
communities in conditions of deep mistrust, adds to a peace process. The role of neutral 
outsiders in “being there” with team sites located in strategic rural and urban areas and with 
regular patrolling through communities reassuring frightened and traumatized groups, 
calming fears, conveying reliable information, helping create or re-create linkages and 
generally building confidence is perhaps the most vital action “monitoring” groups can 
take. That function was doubly rewarding in Solomons where external monitors were able 
to operate in tandem with indigenous monitoring teams.   
 
3. Realistic peace agreements.  The third lesson relates to Peace Agreements.  Peace 
agreements arrived at by the parties to the conflict need to be carefully scrutinized by 
practitioners involved in intervention.  Usually peace agreements favour those parties 
holding the leading hand at the time they are signed. This was particularly the case with the 
TPA - the text of which conformed basically to the draft prepared by the MEF; but not the 
case with the Burnham and Lincoln Agreements for Bougainville. The consequences of an 
unbalanced and unrealistic TPA soon became clear. The SIG had neither capacity nor will 
to meet its development or governance or peace making undertakings and it was still 
largely in thrall to those forces that had made and led the coup of 5 June 2000.  The police 
and militants were absolved of responsibilities for their actions by receiving blanket 
amnesties. When the deadline for the return of stolen weapons (and stolen property) passed, 
the SIG and the police were unwilling (and/or unable) to act against (a) themselves – the 
police retained many weapons illegally, and (b) the militants, thus leaving the balance of 
modern weapons very obviously with the MEF and its supporters. 
 
Could Australia and New Zealand have insisted at the TPA talks in Cairns in October 2000 
that the Agreement be more balanced and prescriptive of a realistic and more direct way 
forward?xiii  Probably not.  Obvious intrusions into the substance of the agreement would 
likely have met resistance from one or other of the parties.  (It appears from anecdotal 
evidence that the facilitators of the Bougainville agreements felt less constrained).  The 
primary objective of the Australian and regional governments was to “stop the fighting”.  
Following that went the hope that all signatories would honour their commitments and 
undertakings. There are a number of lessons here apart from the need to secure a sound 
Agreement and to avoid hopeful or “best-case” thinking.  In the event that a peace 
agreement is distorted and/or unrealistic, (in my view) it is incumbent upon external players 
to assess the likely consequences and course of events with a view to influencing the 
domestic peace process more vigorously through diplomatic and other means. 
 
4.  Clear and adequate mandates.  All literature on peacekeeping operations make the 
important point that intervening forces need clear and adequate mandates. The mandates for 
the TMG and PMG were clear and according to the military leaders and their senior civilian 
negotiators, provided sound guidance.  A civilian negotiator observed, however, that in 
view of the proactive remit for the PMG, the day-to-day duties of the group were not so 
obvious and required flexibility and initiative to handle the demands of facilitation and 
negotiation between the parties and, when necessary, to be inventive in keeping the 
momentum of the peace process moving forward. 
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The IPMT’s mandate (reviewed after the TPA) was equally clear: it was tasked to build 
confidence in the peace process between the parties and within the community; to conduct 
the return of weapons from militants and communities (disarmament); to store such 
armaments securely; and to report to and to work in support of the PMC. An additional part 
of the IPMT leader’s brief was to avoid “mission creep” and to keep an exit strategy under 
continuous review.  But the IPMT’s mandate was effectively constrained, firstly by it not 
having enforcement authority with which to pursue its disarmament function (persuasion 
and reliance on the good will of the communities being its only arsenal) and secondly, by it 
being tied to the policy approach pursued by the PMC.  The IPMT was clearly under-
mandated.  But had it been mandated to enforce weapons return then a different sort of 
intervention involving armed personnel would have been required: a prospect not 
contemplated by Australia and New Zealand and one most unlikely to have been agreed to 
by the TPA parties.  
 
5. Focus on process as much as on outcomes.xiv  Perhaps the most important lesson to 
emerge from these two case studies is that the ending of conflict and the construction of 
peace be recognised and treated as a process with a focus on getting stakeholders and 
players to agree on positions if not on interests.xv  This was clearly the case in Bougainville.  
The timeline of the conflict in Accord showsxvi a series of halting attempts at ceasefire, 
accords, negotiations from 1990, through to peace conferences and talks in the mid-90s, 
then peace forums prior to the important Burnham and Lincoln agreements resulting in the 
insertion of the TMG initially then the PMG.  More intensive dialogue and negotiations 
then followed both internally and with the PNG government culminating in the signing of 
the Bougainville Peace Agreement with PNG in early 2001.  As Bougainvillean groups 
divided along geographical and “ideological/political” lines (i.e. on positions of autonomy 
and independence) it was impossible to avoid a process.   
 
Tony Regan recounts the step-by-step discussions, debates, position-building, consensus 
and compromise seeking within and between groups and the months of effort sorting out 
options so as to build a common position to put to the PNG Government.  (The PNG 
government itself underwent shifts in position through the same period as it sought to 
satisfy its own constituent elements).  Numerous groups had to be kept informed and 
persuaded of the course decided upon.xvii  Throughout 1997-8 to 2002, the TMG/PMG 
played a pivotal facilitating and “lubricating” role – ensuring that talks went ahead, ferrying 
leaders and representatives to meetings and generally assisting the negotiating parties on 
Bougainville.  In a sense this “process” reflected the text-book maxim of the necessity to 
get the process right if conflict resolution is to be successful.xviii  But we should not 
overlook the importance of diplomatic interventions, for example, to break deadlocks as 
occurred with Alexander Downer’s suggestion to both sides in late 2000 of the possibility 
of a deferred referendum which might include the issue of independence. 
 
In contrast, there was a process of sorts in Solomons, but it was much shorter, it engaged 
the key players/stakeholders far less intensively, dialogue was severely limited and there 
was no opportunity to benefit at that stage from the facilitating role of monitors.  Mediation 
attempts were made throughout 1999 to halt the fighting including a Commonwealth 
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initiative led by Fiji’s General Rabuka; a multilateral team of police peace monitors; and 
peace accords were attempted (Panatina and Honiara) but were ignored.  Following the 
coup in June 2000, ceasefire and preliminary peace talks facilitated by the Australian and 
New Zealand governments took place and ultimately the combatants were persuaded to 
travel to Townsville in October that year to negotiate a peace agreement.  But there was 
little opportunity to develop and articulate positions – domestic resources available for that 
were skewed very heavily in favour of one side; and civil society was intimidated and 
warned against engagement.  
 
Despite its shortcomings, the TPA did set up an innovative framework that would hopefully 
take the peace process forward.  It was hoped that with the formation of the indigenous 
PMC, local ownership of the process would occur and, with the support of an external 
monitoring group (the IPMT) with a primary role of immediate weapons collection, the 
conflict could be settled within a reasonable time frame.  One of the major missing 
ingredients here (alongside the lack of enforcement authority) – and a most important 
lesson – was the lack of intensive and sustained engagement with the parties and major 
players and more broadly with civil society and community groupings to build a 
constituency for peace. 
 
In my view it was a strategic error not to engineer (or at least attempt) regular meetings of 
the parties, or of the peace monitors with the parties, to talk through issues and positions 
and to attempt to bring about a genuine dialogue on peace construction.  Conflict resolution 
theory talks of the need for peacebuilding activities to be designed to encourage both 
vertical and horizontal links between and within conflicting parties.xix  “Engage and engage 
– agreements are only milestones” is the entreaty we hear from NGO peace practitioners.xx  
Whether the parties were keen to do that is a moot point, and whether we could have 
avoided a return to fighting, is another.  For many, the status quo suited their interests. 
 
6. Indigenous ownership.  This brings us to the question – rather than lesson – of 
indigenous ownership of the peace process.  In Bougainville – there was no single “owner”, 
but it was clearly the Bougainvilleans who “owned” what was going on. There was no 
government to rely on, or to hold accountable, or to blame. They had to sort out their own 
affairs.  In Solomons the PMC was the indigenous leader of the peace process, but it – and 
the peace process generally - occupied centre stage for only a year or so.  The lesson is that 
indigenous ownership is essential; but it must have the resources, structure, composition, 
mandate and linkage strategy appropriate to the situation. Without resources the PMC 
wasn’t able to drive the process.  Without the SIG playing a role the PMC was powerless to 
oversee and enforce compliance.  (The SIG, in fact, had not opened or read any of the 
PMC’s reports to it for the first six months of the process!)  Having ex-militant 
commanders from either side of the conflict represented on the PMC was an innovation; but 
it didn’t work, largely because they carried only a watching brief and had variable authority 
in their own organisations.  
 
7. Multi-faceted role.  Post-conflict situations require multi-faceted action.  Peace building 
operations, for example to restore the rule of law, require an integrated approach involving 
policing, legal institution-building, civil administration and the building of public support.  
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Peace monitors in Melanesia, on a much more limited scale, also need a multi-faceted role.  
They cannot simply hang about and “monitor”.  To engage effectively, they need to be able 
to deliver something material to communities.  Clearly they cannot and should not try to 
substitute as service delivery agencies; but by facilitating contacts and linkages with 
donors, assisting in the targeting of relief to communities as a form of peace dividend, and 
encouraging womens’ and other social and development organisations increases their 
effectiveness.  It would appear that relief and reconstruction efforts in Bougainville were 
more integrated with the work of monitoring teams than was the case in Solomons.    
 
An issue that arose in the course of both monitoring exercises was the extent to which 
monitors became involved in local dispute resolution.  Orthodoxy says to stay out – yet 
informally the work of monitors in many occasions contributed to a satisfactory local 
outcome.  I’m reminded of a critique of UN peace operations that too often timidity 
masquerades as neutrality (Malone and Thakur, 2001, 14) 
 
8.  Communications strategy.  A frequent theme in the evaluations of peace operations is 
that better use should have been made of the media to explain what was happening in the 
peace process and of the outsiders’ role.  This is no doubt true of both Bougainville and 
Solomons, but it is an infrastructure and media access problem rather than one of correct 
messages.  Radio, television and print media access is woefully inadequate in Melanesian 
countries.  There is absolutely no doubt that enhanced communications would lead to better 
local understanding of the state of play and enable peace groups to operate more 
effectively.   
 
9.   Size, composition, mix of personnel, gender balance, training.  It is trite to say –as do 
many evaluations - that planners must get it right to suit local conditions.  The civilian, 
military, police mix in the two case studies appears to have worked well.  The IPMT and 
PMC were under-resourced to the extent that they were insufficiently mobile within and 
between provinces.  The biggest lesson derived, however, was the value added by having 
Pacific Islander monitors as an integral part of the teams.  Pre-deployment training is a 
universally recurring demand.  This underscores a further lesson for regional governments 
and that is to develop a professional cadre of monitors. The continued use of mixed forces 
in peace building (and possibly state building) operations also has implications for the 
appropriate training of military and police personnel. 
 
10.  “Brains  trusts”?   A point on which to conclude this list of lessons, but by no means 
the final word, is the critique expressed by commanders and team leaders of many peace 
operations that they receive insufficient guidance from Headquarters.  It was an opinion 
expressed, for example, by one of the army commanders of the PMG who reckoned that too 
much responsibility was left on his shoulders for carrying the peace process forward.  It 
was not my experience during my time with the IPMT, but there were occasions in which 
being able to bounce ideas around on ways forward or on novel approaches (e.g. in 
methods of disarmament) with a group of interlocutors who had had comparative 
experience would have been valuable. 
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Concluding Note 
 
There are a bundle of issues that deserve attention including the question of disarmament 
strategies and timing (i.e. early in the peace process as attempted in Solomons or late as in 
Bougainville), dealing with spoilers, and exit strategies; but I will leave those for another 
occasion. 
 
In summary, the peace monitoring interventions in Bougainville and Solomon Islands may 
be seen as useful external mechanisms for assisting in the amelioration of conflict and the 
construction of more peaceful situations; but they clearly offer no fix.  The lessons outlined 
above may well be useful in the event that monitoring operations are required again in the 
region.  They may also be useful to the more comprehensive intervention currently in 
prospect for Solomon Islands; but there are lessons of a higher order to do with state and 
nation building that will need to be applied in that circumstance.  
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